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ABSTRACT. Behavioral conditions such as compound invariance for risky choice and 
constant decreasing relative impatience for intertemporal choice have surprising 
implications for the underlying decision model. They imply a multiplicative 
separability of outcomes and either probability or time. Hence the underlying model 
must be prospect theory or discounted utility on the domain of prospects with one 
nonzero outcome. We indicate implications for richer domains with multiple 
outcomes, and with both risk and time involved. 
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1. Introduction 
 Expected utility (EU; von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) and constant 
discounted utility (CDU; Samuelson 1937) are the normative standards for decision 
under risk and intertemporal choice, respectively. Alternative behavioral models, such 
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as prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992) and hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 
1997; Loewenstein & Prelec 1992) were motivated by well known empirical 
violations of these normative standards. Thus people exhibit risk aversion in ways that 
expected utility cannot capture (Allais 1953), and discounting decreases because 
impatience decreases over time (Strotz 1956). The alternative models combine a 
generalized decision model, establishing representations more flexible than EU and 
CDU, with auxiliary psychophysical axioms yielding tractable parametric functional 
forms. This article shows that these psychophysical axioms determine the underlying 
decision model itself in a number of important cases, something that has gone 
unnoticed as yet. In particular, we will show that Prelec’s (1998) compound 
invariance condition, usually added to a presupposed prospect theory, by itself implies 
prospect theory on the domain considered in his study. In the same way, similar 
preference conditions usually added to a presupposed discounted utility, by 
themselves imply discounted utility for intertemporal choice. The substantive message 
is that simple psychophysical principles give rise to the leading behavioral models for 
risk and intertemporal choice. 
 We will derive the aforementioned implications using two technical tools that are 
of interest in their own right. The first tool is an operation that derives endogenous 
midpoints for probability weighting and time discounting from preferences. It clarifies 
the formal and intuitive content of preference conditions such as compound 
invariance. The second tool is a generalized method to analyze functional equations, 
summarized in Figure D.1 in Appendix D. This appendix will show that several 
classical characterizations in decision theory concern the same mathematical theorem 
and differ by no more than a simple substitution of variables. For example, Prelec’s 
(1998) characterization of compound invariance probability weighting under prospect 
theory becomes the same mathematical theorem as the classical characterizations of 
CARA (constant absolute risk aversion, or linear-exponential) and CRRA (constant 
relative risk averse, or log-power) utility under expected utility. Other “identical” 
theorems concern conditional invariance probability weighting (Prelec 1998) and the 
constant relative decreasing impatient (renamed unit invariant in this paper) time 
discount functions of Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker (2009) and Ebert & Prelec 
(2007). Thus we provide the simplest proofs of these results presently available in the 
literature, and we extend them to domains more general than considered before. 
Figure D.1 is of independent interest. It puts all the results on functional equations 
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together, and can be of use to any application of the concerned families of functional 
equations. Remark D.2 lists many well-known theorems in the literature that are 
immediate corollaries of Figure D.1. 
 The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 states the basic problems of this 
paper for risk and time jointly, showing what these problems have in common. It also 
defines the domain analyzed in our main results, being simple prospects with only one 
nonzero outcome. Section 3 presents the specific result of most interest for risk, and 
§4 does so for time. In the latter section we focus on unit invariant discounting, which 
has more promising empirical and analytical properties than the commonly used 
hyperbolic discounting. Section 5 discusses implications of our results. Because 
virtually all theories for risk and time agree on the domain considered in our main 
results (only one nonzero outcome), our results are relevant for all those theories. We 
demonstrate implications for richer domains of prospects with multiple nonzero 
outcomes. §6 concludes. Examples are in Appendix A. Appendixes B and C prepare 
for the proofs, and Appendix D completes the proofs. 
 
2. Statement of the problem 
 In the risk domain, with (x,p) denoting the (risky) prospect of receiving outcome 
x with probability p and nothing otherwise, one might observe  
 (x,p)  (y,q) but (x,rp)  (y,rq) for 0 < r < 1,  (2.1) 
in violation of expected utility. Allais (1953) gave convincing examples of this 
pattern, which were later confirmed empirically. In the time domain, if (x,t) denotes 
the (temporal) prospect of receiving outcome x at time t, then one might observe  
 (x,t)  (y,s) but (x,r+t)  (y,r+t)  (2.2) 
(Ainslie 1975), in violation of constant discounted utility. While these empirical 
phenomena can be captured by a variety of different models, all currently popular 
models for risky and intertemporal decisions assume the same, multiplicative, 
underlying decision model  
 V(x,p) = w(p)U(x)  or  V(x,t) = f(t)U(x)  (2.3) 
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for prospects with one nonzero outcome. This entails independent scaling (or 
separability) of outcomes and probability or time. Besides expected utility (the case 
where w(p) = p), the best-known case of Eq. 2.3 for risk is prospect theory. 
 To obtain useful functional forms of w and f, plausible restrictions have been 
imposed on the propagation of EU and CDU violations (explained in Eqs. 2.4 and 2.7 
below). For risk, EU violations can, for instance, be preserved under compounding if 
an Allais-violation of the form  
 (x,p) ~ (y,q) and (x,rp) ~ (y,rs) for s  q1 
propagates such that  
 (x´,p

) ~ (y´,q

) implies (x´,(rp)

) ~ (y´,(rs)

). (2.4) 
Here p

 is the  fold compound of p. This condition is Prelec’s (1998) compound 
invariance condition. The propagation of EU violations continues and, by repeated 
application, we get Eq. 2.4 with n instead of  for any natural n. Within a 
multiplicative representation (2.3), such a propagation of Allais-violations implies that 
the weighting function is of the form: 
 w(p)  =  (exp( (ln p)))  (2.5) 
(Prelec 1998, Proposition 1). A natural question that arises is how compound 
invariance can be combined with more general non-multiplicative representations, i.e. 
with forms deviating from Eq. 2.3. For example, one could allow the  parameter in 
Eq. 2.5 to depend on outcome magnitude: 
 V(x,p) = (exp( (ln p)(x)))U(x) (2.6) 
in order to accommodate the finding that probability weighting is more nonlinear at 
high stakes.
2
 
 A parallel situation obtains for time. The corresponding propagation axiom 
asserts that CDU violations will be preserved if a violation of the form  
                                               
1 This is equivalent to Eq. 2.1 (increase q and take s < q). 
2 This phenomenon was found in empirical studies by Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre (2006), Camerer 
(1989 p. 94), Etchart (2004, 2009), Fehr-Duda et al. (2010), Rottenstreich & Hsee (2001), Sutter & 
Poitras (2010), and Tversky & Kahneman (1992 p. 317). 
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 (x,t) ~ (y,s) and (x,r+t) ~ (y,r+q) for q  s 
propagates such that 
 (x´,t) ~ (y´, s) implies (x´,((r+t))) ~ (y´,((r+q))). (2.7) 
This propagation of CDU violations was called constant relative decreasing 
impatience by Prelec (1998 Definition 4) and by Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker 
(2009). We will refer to it as unit invariance. Within a multiplicative representation 
(Eq. 2.3) unit invariance implies that the discount function is of the form: 
 f(t) =  k  exp(rtc)   (2.8) 
(Ebert & Prelec 2007; Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker 2009). Again, a natural question 
is how unit invariance can be combined with more general non-multiplicative 
representations, deviating from Eq. 2.3. A non-multiplicative generalization of Eq 2.8 
results if the time-discount parameter r depends on the magnitude of the discounted 
outcome x
3
: 
 V(x,t) = k  exp(–r(x)tc)U(x). (2.9) 
Theoretical models for our domain (prospects with one nonzero outcome) that 
incorporate interactions deviation from Eq. 2.3 include Baucells & Heukamp (2012 
Theorem 1), Noor (2009, 2011), and Takeuchi (2011 p. 457). Baucells & Heukamp’s 
(2012) probability-time tradeoff theory considers one nonzero outcome but with both 
time and risk involved, and allows for many kinds of interactions, including the ones 
discussed here. Blavatskyy (2013) presents an appealing direct empirical test of the 
separability of Eq. 2.3, finding it violated.
4
 Models that give up separability between 
outcomes and time/risk in richer domains with multiple nonzero outcomes include 
Chew & Wakker (1996), Chiu (1996), Green & Jullien (1988), and Karni (2003: state-
dependent utility). Section 5 will discuss the implications of preference conditions 
such as unit invariance on such richer domains. 
 All previous papers on the propagation of violations have stated the multiplicative 
decision model of Eq. 2.3 as an extra assumption (Aczél & Luce 2007; Al-Nowaihi & 
                                               
3 This phenomenon, the magnitude effect, has been found in many empirical studies (Benzion, 
Rapoport, & Yagil 1989; Thaler 1981; reviewed by Attema 2012 §3.4). 
4 Blavatskyy in fact tests the well-known Thomsen condition, a necessary and sufficient condition that 
by itself is somewhat stronger than the hexagon condition that we will use later. 
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Dhami 2006; Luce 2001). This raises the question what the propagations imply for the 
more general decision models referenced above, which relax the separability of Eq. 
2.3. The surprising conclusion will be that the propagations exclude all these more 
general models and, hence, cannot be considered in these models. That is, as we will 
show, both compound invariance and unit invariance by themself imply the 
multiplicative forms of Eq. 2.3. It is remarkable that no-one, including the authors of 
the present paper (Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker 2009; Ebert & Prelec 2007; Prelec 
1998), has noticed these implications before, so that all the papers up to now 
contained a redundant assumption. 
 
3. Compound invariance probability weighting for 
multiplicative preference representations under risk 
 
3.1. Elementary definitions for multiplicative representations 
We consider (risky) prospects (x,p) yielding outcome x with probability p and 
outcome 0 with probability 1  p. With X a nonpoint interval in + containing 0, the 
set of all prospects considered is X  [0,1].5 By  we denote a preference relation over 
prospects, with , ~, , and  as usual. We identify all (0,p) and (x,0) with (0,0). That 
is, (0,p) ~ (x,0) ~ (0,0) for all x and p. Strict stochastic dominance holds if [(x,p)  (y,p) 
whenever x > y and p > 0], and further [(x,p)  (x,q) whenever x > 0 and p > q].  
 For the preference relation , V is representing if V maps the domain of 
preference (X  [0,1] in this case) to the reals and [(x,p)  (y,q)  V(x,p)  V(y,q)]. If 
a representing V exists then  is a weak order: it is transitive and complete ((x,p)  
(y,q) or (y,q)  (x,p) for all prospects). Continuity of V implies continuity of : {(y,q): 
(y,q)  (x,p)} and {(y,q): (y,q)  (x,p)} are closed subsets of the prospect space X  
[0,1] for each prospect (x,p).  
                                               
5 Prelec (1998) assumed a set of outcomes [x,x+] with x < 0 < x+, so that both gains and losses were 
involved. Following prospect theory, the preferences for losses [x,0] were treated separately from 
those for gains. For simplicity, we will only consider gains. Our results for gains can be applied to 
losses as well. 
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DEFINITION 3.1. The representation V for decision under risk is multiplicative if there 
exist functions w: [0,1]   and U: X   such that: 
 V(x,p) = w(p)U(x).  (3.1) 
U(0) = 0 and U is continuous and strictly increasing. (3.2) 
w is continuous and strictly increasing, 
and w(0) = 0.   (3.3) 
We call U the utility function and w the weighting function.   
 
In what follows, we can always normalize w(1) = 1. Multiplicative representability 
implies strict stochastic dominance. 
 A clarifying interpretation of the conditions presented later in this paper can be 
obtained by adapting an endogenous midpoint operation, proposed by Köbberling and 
Wakker (2003 p. 408) for additive representations, to our multiplicative 
representation. We call q the endogenous midpoint between p and r, denoted m(p,r) = 
q, if there exist outcomes x and y such that 
 (x,p) ~ (y,q)  & 
 (x,q) ~ (y,r) (3.4) 
where all outcomes and probabilities differ from 0 (Figure 3.1). In the indifferences 
(3.4), p and q offset the same outcome difference as q and r. We call x and y the 
gauge outcomes. The following lemma shows that an endogenous midpoint is a 
geometric midpoint in terms of w-units in our multiplicative model. The result holds 
irrespective of the utility function. For an alternative way to obtain results on 
discounting independently of utility, a detailed discussion, and a review see Takeuchi 
(2011). 
 
LEMMA 3.2. Assume a multiplicative representation w(p)U(x). Then 
 q = m(p,r)    w(q) = w(p)w(r) . 
 
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3.2. Compound invariance and the hexagon condition 
 We will examine the following family of weighting functions (Prelec 1998), as in 
Eq. 2.5: 
 
DEFINITION 3.3.  w(p) is compound invariant if there exist  > 0 and  > 0 such that 
w(p) = (exp(−(−lnp))).   
 
We consider the following weakening of Prelec’s (1998) compound invariance 
preference condition. For  > 0, -compound invariance holds if 
 (x,p) ~ (y,q) & (y,p

) ~ (z,q

) & 
(x,q) ~ (y,r) 
   (y,q) ~ (z,r)  (3.5) 
for all nonzero outcomes x, y, and z and nonzero probabilities p, q, and r for which 
also p

, q

,and r

 are contained in [0,1]).
6
 To interpret the condition, we display 1-
compound invariance (Figure 3.2): 
                                               
6 -compound invariance is weaker than Prelec’s (1998) compound invariance in two respects. First, 
compound invariance requires Eq. 3.5 for all natural numbers , whereas we will impose it only for 
particular . Second, in the notation of §2, we restrict attention to the case of x = y and rp = q. This 
subpart of compound invariance allows for an interpretation in terms of midpoints  presented later. 
x y 
p 
q 
r 
FIGURE 3.1.  Endogenous 
midpoint operation 
x and y serve as a 
gauge to show that p is 
to q what q is to r. 
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 (x,p) ~ (y,q) & (y,p) ~ (z,q) & 
(x,q) ~ (y,r) 
   (y,q) ~ (z,r)  (3.6) 
for all nonzero outcomes x, y, and z and nonzero probabilities p, q, and r. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-compound invariance is identical to the hexagon condition for nonzero outcomes 
and probabilities. The hexagon condition (Karni & Safra 1998) is a consistency 
requirement for endogenous midpoints. The left two indifferences in Eq. 3.6 imply 
that the midpoint of p and r is q when the gauges are x and y. The right two 
indifferences confirm this for gauges y and z. Hence, -compound invariance (Eq. 
3.5) implies that endogenous midpoints are preserved under -power taking. The 
following lemma expresses this implication in terms of w. 
 
LEMMA 3.4 [Invariance of geometric w-midpoints under -th power]. Under 
multiplicative representation, -compound invariance (Eq. 3.5) is equivalent to  
 w(q) = w(p)w(r)    w(q) = w(p)w(r). (3.7) 
  
 
3.3. Multiplicative representation and the main result 
 The hexagon condition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an additive 
representation Z(x) + W(p) under common regularity conditions (Karni & Safra 1998). 
That is, the hexagon condition is the two-dimensional analog of separability. At this 
stage, additive representability Z(x) + W(p) amounts to multiplicative representability 
p 
q 
r 
FIGURE 3.2.  The hexagon condition 
= 1-compound invariance 
The indifference in bold is implied by 
the other three indifferences. 
x y z 
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when excluding outcome 0 and probability 0: By taking the exponent of Z(x) + W(p) 
we obtain a positive multiplicative representation e
Z(x)+W(p)
 = e
Z(x)
e
W(p)
. We then define 
w(p) = e
W(p)
 and U(x) = e
Z(x)
. By assigning 0 utility to the 0 outcome and 0 weight to 
the 0 probability, respectively, we obtain the multiplicative representation on the 
whole of X×[0,1]. 
 
OBSERVATION 3.5. The following two statements are equivalent for  on X  [0,1]: 
(i) A multiplicative representation w(p)U(x) (Definition 3.1) exists. 
(ii)  is a continuous weak order that satisfies strict stochastic dominance and 1-
compound invariance (which is the hexagon condition for nonzero outcomes and 
probabilities), and (0,p) ~ (x,0) ~ (0,0) for all p,x.  
In Statement (i), w and U are unique up to separate positive factors and a joint 
positive power. This implies that we can take a positive factor for w such that w(1) = 
1.  
 
The multiplicative representation need not be presupposed when analyzing compound 
invariance because it is automatically implied. It leads to the following efficient 
preference foundation of prospect theory with compound invariant probability 
weighting for single nonzero outcomes. 
 
THEOREM 3.6. The following two statements are equivalent for the binary relation  
on prospects (x,p) from X  [0,1] with X  + a nonpoint interval containing 0: 
(i) A multiplicative representation w(p)U(x) (Definition 3.1) exists with w from the 
compound invariance family (Definition 3.3). 
(ii)  satisfies: weak ordering, continuity, strict stochastic dominance, -compound 
invariance for  = 1, 2, and 3, and (0,p) ~ (x,0) ~ (0,0) for all p,x. 
In Statement (i), U and w are unique up to a joint positive power, and U is unique up 
to a separate positive factor. This implies that  in Eq. 2.5 is uniquely determined 
from preference, but that  > 0 there can be chosen arbitrarily (jointly with the power 
of U). In (ii), -compound invariance can be imposed for all  > 0.  
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In the compound invariant representation, w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1 are automatically 
satisfied.  
 
4. Invariant discount functions for multiplicative 
intertemporal preference representations 
 
4.1. Elementary definitions for multiplicative representations 
(Intertemporal) prospects (x,t) yield an outcome x at time point t and outcome 0 at all 
other time points. X  T is the set of all prospects considered, with both X and T 
nonpoint intervals within + and X containing 0.7 , , ~, , and  are as before. We 
have (0,s) ~ (0,t) for all s,t. That is, we identify all (0,t) (never receiving anything). 
Time monotonicity holds if [(x,s)  (x,t) whenever x > 0 and s < t] and [(x,t)  (y,t) 
whenever x > y] (the latter also holds if t = 0). Thus the decision maker is impatient: 
outcomes received sooner are more desirable and the monotonicity regarding time 
reverses the natural ordering, and t = 0, if contained in T, is most preferred. Impatience 
is constant [decreasing, increasing] if (x,s) ~ (y,t)  (x,s+) ~ (y,t+) [(x,s+)  
(y,t+), (x,s+)  (y,t+)] for all outcomes x,y,  > 0 and time points s, t such that s+ 
and t+ are also in T. Representing functions V are defined as before.  
 
DEFINITION 4.1. V is multiplicative if there exist functions f: T   and U: X   
such that: 
 V(x,t) = f(t)U(x).    (4.1) 
U(0) = 0 and U is continuous and strictly increasing. (4.2) 
f is continuous, strictly decreasing, and positive. (4.3) 
We again call U the utility function, and f is the discount function.   
 
                                               
7 All following results remain true if we only assume about X that, with U defined below, U(X) = (0,) 
for an  > 0 so that it does not contain 0. This assumption was made by Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker 
(2009).  
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These conditions imply time-monotonicity. In what follows, we can always normalize 
f(0) = 1.  
 
4.2. Constant relative decreasing impatience and the hexagon 
condition 
The most popular discount functions today are the quasi-hyperbolic family (Laibson 
1997; Phelps & Pollak 1968) and the generalized hyperbolic family (Loewenstein & 
Prelec 1992). These have the drawback that they can only accommodate decreasing 
impatience. It is desirable to have more flexible families, especially for data fitting at 
the individual level, because there are always some individuals who will exhibit 
increasing impatience (Epper, Fehr-Duda, and Bruhin 2011). The following family 
can serve this purpose, extending Eq. 2.8 by incorporating cases where t = 0 is not 
contained in the time domain T. 
 
DEFINITION 4.2. w(t) is unit invariant if there exist k > 0, r > 0, and c   such that 
 for c < 0, w(t) =  ke
rtc
 (only if 0  T); (4.4) 
for c = 0, w(t) =  kt
r
 (only if 0  T); (4.5) 
for c > 0, w(t) =  ke
rtc
. (4.6) 
 
 
The unit invariance family results from taking the exponent of the well known CRRI 
(logpower) functions. It appeared as the conditional invariance family in Prelec (1998 
Eq. 4.2) for probability weighting
8
, and is characterized by the following preference 
invariance condition: -unit invariance holds if 
 (x,r) ~ (y,s) & (y,r) ~ (z,s) & 
(x,s) ~ (y,t)  
  (y,s) ~ (z,t)  (4.7) 
for all nonzero outcomes x, y, and z, and time-points r, s, and t for which also r, s, 
and t are contained in T. Thus, if r is to s what s is to t, then this relationship is 
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maintained under a change of time unit. The condition is weaker than Prelec’s (1998) 
conditional invariance
9
 because it is imposed on an arbitrary subinterval T of + 
rather than on [0,1]. It is also weaker than Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker’s (2009) 
condition because they imposed it for all positive , whereas we will impose it only 
for 0 <   1. Contrarily to the previous section where we assumed the whole 
probability domain [0,1], we assume a general time interval T here rather than the 
whole time axis [0,). We do this to generalize Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker (2009), 
who also assumed a general time interval T. It will imply that we cannot restrict  to 
three values as we could in the previous section. 
 
4.3. Multiplicative representation, midpoint interpretation, and the 
main result 
 Like 1-compound invariance, 1-unit invariance is equivalent to the hexagon 
condition for all nonzero outcomes. Contrarily to 1-compound invariance where 
probability 0 was excluded, all timepoints t  T, also t = 0, are included. 
 
OBSERVATION 4.2. The following two statements are equivalent for  on X  T: 
(i) A multiplicative representation f(t)U(x) (Definition 4.1) exists. 
(ii) (0,s) ~ (0,t) for all s,t, and  is a continuous weak order that satisfies time-
monotonicity and 1-unit invariance (the hexagon condition for nonzero outcomes).  
In Statement (i), f and U are unique up to separate positive factors and a joint power. 
This implies that we can take a positive factor for f such that f(0) = 1.  
 
-unit invariance (Eq. 4.7) can be interpreted as invariance of endogenous midpoints 
under multiplication by . The following lemma expresses this idea in terms of f. 
                                                                                                                                      
8 Because it was applied to decision under risk, the family was increasing rather than decreasing (r < 0) 
in Prelec (1998). 
9 Prelec assumed the condition only for all 0 <  < 1 (whereas we will impose it also for  = 1), but then 
the condition for  = 1 follows from continuity. We will ignore this difference in what follows. Further, 
in Prelec’s notation, we only consider the case of r = q and y = x´. Ebert & Prelec (2007) derived Eq. 4.6 
from a stronger condition, scale invariance, which states (in preference terms) that if r is to s what q is 
to t, then this relationship is maintained under a change of time unit on the interval (0,1]. 
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LEMMA 4.3 [Invariance of geometric w-midpoints under -th power]. Under 
multiplicative representation, -unit invariance is equivalent to  
 f(s) = f (t) f (r)    f (s) = f (t) f (r). (4.8) 
  
 
We now obtain the following preference foundation of discounted utility with unit 
invariant discounting. 
 
THEOREM 4.4. The following two statements are equivalent for the binary relation  
on prospects (x,t) from X  T with X and T nonpoint subintervals of +: 
(i) A multiplicative representation f(t)U(x) (Definition 4.1) exists with f from the 
unit invariance family (Definition 4.2). 
(ii) (0,s) ~ (0,t) for all s,t, and  satisfies: weak ordering, continuity, time-
monotonicity, and -unit invariance for 0 <   1 (Eq. 4.7). 
In Statement (i), f and U are unique up to separate positive factors and a joint power. 
This implies that the parameter c in Eqs. 4.4-4.6 is uniquely determined from 
preference, but that k can be chosen arbitrariy, and so can r > 0 (jointly with the power 
of U).  In (ii), -unit invariance can be imposed for all  > 0.  
 
 A necessary and sufficient condition for constant discounting is that m(p,r) = 
(p+r)/2 (Fishburn & Rubinstein 1982). Prelec (1998) and Bleichrodt, Rohde, & 
Wakker (2009) also considered a CADI family for f, where endogenous midpoints are 
invariant under addition of a constant. This condition also implies the hexagon 
condition (let the constant added be 0), and the above results can be extended to this 
case. However, the CADI family seems to fit data for intertemporal choice worse than 
the unit invariance family (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & l’Haridon 2013) and we will not 
give the extension in this paper.  
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5. Implications for richer domains 
 Because virtually all existing theories for risk agree on our domain of one 
nonzero outcome, and differ only in their extensions to multiple outcomes, our results 
are relevant for all those theories.
10
 Most studies of intertemporal choice have focused 
on the same domain as we considered. However, for decision under risk, richer 
domains with more nonzero outcomes have usually been considered. Our domain 
suffices to determine the utility of outcomes, and the weighting of probabilities, up to 
a common power. Thus, for rank-dependent utility (which is prospect theory for 
gains) the preferences considered in this paper determine the preferences over the 
whole domain up to this one parameter. The common power can be inferred from one 
indifference involving more than one nonzero outcome. An example is the certainty 
equivalence y ~ (p:x, 1p:z). This indifference can be chosen carefully so as to give 
maximally reliable results. Because prospects with one nonzero outcome are easy to 
understand, restricting most measurements to this domain will enhance reliability.  
 Baucells & Heukamp (2012) introduced a model where both time and risk are 
present. In their model prospects are triples (x,p,t), meaning that outcome x is 
received at time t with probability p. They axiomatize a form  
 w(pe
rxt)U(x),  (5.1) 
based on a separable treatment of probability and time, aggregated into psychological 
distance, at each fixed level of outcome (their Axiom A3) and a separable treatment of 
probability and outcomes at time t = 0 (their Axiom A5). In their §6 they propose a 
subfamily that is promising for empirical purposes: 
 e
((ln p+rxt))U(x) . (5.2) 
                                               
10 Other models include Allais (1953; several models), Birnbaum’s (2008) RAM and TAX models, 
Edwards (1962), Kahneman & Tversky (1979), Miyamoto (1988), Quiggin (1982), Tversky & 
Kahneman (1992), and Viscusi (1989). Some betweenness models are also included: Gul (1991) and 
Routledge & Zin (2010). A betweenness model not included is Chew’s weighted utility (Chew & Tan 
2005; Chew & Waller 1986). Also excluded are quadratic forms (Chew, Epstein, & Segal 1991; 
Machina 1982 Eq. 6, see Example 3.7). Obviously, theories that violate transitivity, such as regret 
theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982), are also excluded. A direct intransitive generalization of Eq. 2.1 is 
in Dubra (2009) and Ok & Masatlioglu (2007). 
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In Eq. 5.2, both probability (satisfying compound invariance) and time (satisfying unit 
invariance, generalized in an outcome dependent manner) are evaluated as in our 
Theorems 3.6 and 4.4. We can, therefore, immediately axiomatize Baucells and 
Heukamp’s proposal by replacing their central axiom (their A5) on tradeoffs between 
probabilities and outcomes at time 0 by compound invariance.
11
 We can similarly 
apply our techniques to the tradeoffs between time and probability.
12
 Further 
extensions of our results to general multiattribute settings, and other implications of 
our results for richer domains, are left to future studies. 
 We have derived theorems for pairs (x,p) or (x,t) where we focused on functional 
forms evaluating the second coordinate as probability or time. One could reinterpret 
the second coordinate as outcome (in some cases to be properly normalized) and the 
first coordinate as time or probability (or something else), again, after proper 
rescaling. Then one would obtain similar representations as provided in this paper, but 
obtaining specific forms for utility functions. We did not follow this route because the 
functional forms obtained are of primary interest for probability and time, and not for 
utility. But results in the same spirit may be conceivable for alternative functional 
forms that are of interest for utilities, and this is a topic for future research. Of course, 
we could also impose our axioms on both dimensions simultaneously, restricting both 
utility and discounting or probability weighting. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Using an endogenous midpoint operation for probability and time perception, we 
have clarified the empirical and logical status of popular psychophysical preference 
conditions, including Prelec’s (1998) compound invariance for risk and unit 
invariance for time. These conditions for probability and time imply a multiplicative 
representation in which outcomes can be scaled independently from risk or time. All 
                                               
11  It implies their A5 and additionally imposes the desired functional forms.  In particular, because of 
their A3, it also implies what both those authors and we consider to be the most plausible family for 
intertemporal discounting. 
12  We then replace their axiom A3 by, for instance, unit invariance and thus generalize the linear 
treatment of probability. 
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previous papers imposed these conditions on top of underlying decision models. This 
paper has shown that the conditions by themselves imply the underlying decision 
models, so that assuming these models separately was redundant. 
 
Appendix A. Examples 
EXAMPLE A.1 [Multiplicative model with hexagon condition and compound 
invariance satisfied, implying that endogenous midpoints are consistent and invariant 
under power taking]. Assume Eqs. 2.3 and 2.5 with  = 0.65,  = 1, and U(x) = x0.88. 
We discuss the following preferences and indifferences, which follow from 
substitution of the preference functional:
13
 
 (30, 0.90) ~ (70, 0.38)    (70, 0.90) ~ (163, 0.38)    (10, 0.729) ~ (57, 0.055) 
(30, 0.38) ~ (70, 0.10)     (10, 0.055) ~ (57, 0.001) 
   (70, 0.38) ~ (163, 0.10).  
 
The left two indifferences use the gauge outcomes 30 and 70 to elicit that 0.38 is the 
enodgenous midpoint between 0.10 and 0.90. The middle two indifferences use 
different gauge outcomes, 70 and 163, but confirm the elicitation. Consequently, the 
left four indifferences corroborate the hexagon condition. The right two indifferences 
use third powers of probabilities, 0.90
3
 = 0.729, 0.38
3
 = 0.055, and 0.1
3
 = 0.001. They 
show that 0.055 = m(0.729, 0.001) (modulo rounding), implying that endogenous 
midpoints are invariant with respect to third power taking. This corroborates 
compound invariance.  
 
EXAMPLE A.2 [Multiplicative model with hexagon condition satisfied but compound 
invariance violated; endogenous midpoints are consistent but they are not invariant 
under power taking]. Assume Eq. 2.3 with  w(p)  = 
p
0.61
(p
0.61
 + (1p)0.61)
1/0.61  and U(x) = 
x
0.88
, the values found by Tversky & Kahneman (1992). We discuss the following 
preferences and indifferences: 
                                               
13 Below, indifference probabilities are rounded by two digits. 
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 (30, 0.90) ~ (64, 0.39)  (64, 0.90) ~ (137, 0.39)  (10, 0.729) ~ (79, 0.024) 
(30, 0.39) ~ (64, 0.10)   (10, 0.024) ~ (79, 0.001) 
   (64, 0.39) ~ (137, 0.10).  
 
The left two indifferences use the gauge outcomes 30 and 64 to elicit 0.39 = m(0.10, 
0.90). The middle two indifferences use different gauge outcomes, 64 and 137, but 
confirm the elicitation. Consequently, the left four indifferences corroborate the 
hexagon condition. The right two indifferences test compound invariance, by 
considering third powers of probabilities. Compound invariance is violated, because 
0.0586 = 0.39
3
  m(0.903, 0.13) = m(0.729, 0.001). Instead, that midpoint is 0.024, 
which is considerably smaller. Thus this multiplicative decision model does satisfy 
the hexagon condition, but not compound invariance.  
 
EXAMPLE A.3 [No multiplicative model; the hexagon condition is violated; no 
consistent endogenous midpoints; compound invariance is violated a fortiori]. 
Machina (1982, Eq. 6) proposed a representation EU1 + (EU2)
2
/2, with EU2 a different 
expected utility model than EU1, suggesting that this was about the simplest deviation 
from expected utility conceivable. We use this model with expected value (U1(x) = x) 
for EU1 and with utility function 5x
1/5
 for EU2 (the multiplication of the function by 5 
constitutes the most common scaling). We discuss the following preferences and 
indifferences, which follow from substitution:
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 (10, 0.90) ~ (71, 0.36) (71, 0.90) ~ (289, 0.36) (71, 0.90) ~ (310, 0.34) 
(10, 0.36) ~ (71, 0.10)  (71, 0.34) ~ (310, 0.10) 
   (71, 0.36)  (289, 0.10).  
The left two indifferences use the gauge outcomes 10 and 71 to suggest that 0.36 = 
m(0.90, 0.10). The left four indifferences, however, show that the hexagon condition 
is violated. It confirms that the decision model is not multiplicative, and cannot be 
ordinally transformed into a multiplicative form. 
 The middle two indifferences suggest that 0.36 is the endogenous midpoint of 
0.90 and a probability exceeding 0.10. Hence endogenous midpoint measurements 
                                               
14 As throughout, indifference probabilities are rounded by two digits. In the strict preference, the 
probabilities differ by  more than 0.01  from the indifference probabilities, with even (71, 0.35)  (289, 
0.11). 
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will run into inconsistencies. The right two indifferences show that taking the gauge 
outcomes 71 and 310 suggests that 0.34 = m(0.10, 0.90), which is inconsistent with the 
endogenous midpoint 0.36 suggested by the left two indifferences.  
 
Appendix B. Some proofs for Section 3 and preparatory 
results 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2. The left two indifferences in Eq. 3.5 imply w(p)/w(q) = 
U(y)/U(x) = w(q)/w(r), and then w(q) = w(p)w(r). Next assume the latter equality. 
We show that q = m(p,r), by finding appropriate gauges. Because U(0) = 0 and U is 
continuous and strictly increasing, there exist nonzero outcomes x and y with 
w(p)/w(q) = U(y)/U(x), implying (x,p) ~ (y,q). We also have w(q)/w(r) = U(y)/U(x), 
implying (x,q) ~ (y,r). The two indifferences imply that q = m(p,r). A similar way to 
derive geometric w midpoints from preferences can be recognized in Zank (2010, 
Proof of Lemma 3).  
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.4. By substitution, the implication in the lemma implies -
compound invariance. Next assume -compound invariance, and w(q) = w(p)w(r). 
The w condition is vacuously satisfied if one of the probabilities is 0. Hence we 
assume that all probabilities are positive. Assume 0 < p < q < r (the other case, 0 < r < q 
< p, is similar). We take any x > 0, and find, by continuity (and U(0) = 0), smaller 
outcomes y > z > 0 such that the upper two indifferences in Eq. 3.5 hold. The assumed 
w equality implies the left lower indifference in Eq. 3.5. The right two indifferences, 
where the last one is implied by the compound invariance preference condition, imply 
w(q

) = w(p

)w(r

).  
 
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 3.5. The implication (i)  (ii) is left to the reader. In the rest 
of this proof, we assume (ii) and derive (i) and the uniqueness results. We first restrict 
attention to positive probabilities and outcomes. By Wakker (1989 Theorem III.6.6), 
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there exist continuous functions W and Z such that Z(x) + W(p) represents 
preferences.
15
 By strict stochastic dominance, W and Z are strictly increasing. 
 Defining w(p) = e
W(p)
 and U(x) = e
Z(p)
 leads to the multiplicative representation 
U(x)w(p) for all lotteries except (0,0). To ensure that we can take w(0) = 0, we take 
any x > y > 0. We take any probability 1 > q1 > 0 and define probabilities qi inductively: 
By continuity of preference and (x,0)  (y,qi)  (x,qi), there exists a 0 < qi+1 < qi such 
that (x,qi+1) ~ (y,qi), so that w(qi+1)/w(qi) = U(y)/U(x). The latter ratio is a constant r < 
1. Hence w(qi)  r
i1
, which tends to 0. We get limp0w(p) = 0. We define w(0) = 0, and 
w is continuous. A dual reasoning shows that limx0U(x) = 0. We define U(0) = 0, and 
U is continuous. The function (x,p)  w(p)U(x) represents preferences also for p = 0 
and x = 0, because (0,0) is the worst prospect and it also has the lowest evaluation. The 
representation w(p)U(x) satisfies all requirements.  
 For uniqueness, we first consider the domain of positive outcomes and 
probabilities. Wakker (1989 Observation III.6.6´) showed that the additive 
representation Z(x) + W(p) = ln(U(x) + ln(w(p) is unique up to location and common 
unit. It implies that U(x) and w(p) are unique up to unit and a joint power. For zero 
outcomes and probabilities, we have w(0) = 0 and U(0) = 0, which does not affect the 
uniqueness result obtained.  
 
LEMMA B.1. Under multiplicative representation, for each  > 0, -compound 
invariance implies 1/-compound invariance. 
 
PROOF. We use Lemma 3.4. We show that w(q
1/
)  w(p1/)w(r1/) implies w(q)  
w(p)w(r). Assume the former inequality. Say w(q
1/
) > w(p
1/
)w(r
1/
). Assume 0 < 
p < q < r (the case 0 < r < q < p is similar). By continuity, we can increase p into p~ with 
q > p~ > p such that w(q
1/
) = w(p~
1/
)w(r
1/
). -compound invariance and Lemma 3.4 
imply w(q) = w(p~)w(r), implying w(q) > w(p)w(r). Similarly, w(q
1/
) < 
w(p
1/
)w(r
1/
)  implies w(q) < w(p)w(r) by decreasing r.   
 
                                               
15 Given that we only consider nonzero probabilities and outcomes, Wakker’s (1989, Theorem III.6.6) 
coordinate independence is implied by strict stochastic dominance. 
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LEMMA B.2. Under multiplicative representation, -compound invariance for  = 1, 2, 
and 3 implies the condition for all  > 0. 
 
PROOF. Lemma B.1, and repeated application of Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4, implies that -
compound invariance holds for all  = 2k3 with k and  integers. This set is dense in 
+. By continuity of w(p) in  and Lemma 3.4, -compound invariance holds for all 
positive .  
 
Appendix C. Preparatory results and some proofs for 
Section 4 
PROOF OF OBSERVATION 4.2. This is virtually the same as the proof of Observation 
3.5. One difference is that f is strictly decreasing, corresponding with the reversal in 
monotonicity. The other difference is that t = 0 is not degenerate unlike p = 0 so that t = 
0 is part of the domain of W in the additive representation, and its f value is positive. 
 
 
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.3. By substitution, the implication in the lemma implies -unit 
invariance. Next assume -unit invariance, and f(s) = f(t)f(r). Assume 0 < t < s < r 
(the other case, 0 < r < s < t, is similar). We take any x > 0, and find, by continuity (and 
U(0) = 0), smaller y > z > 0 such that the upper two indifferences in Eq. 4.7 hold. The 
assumed f equality implies the left lower indifference in Eq. 4.7. The right two 
indifferences, where the last one is implied by the unit invariance preference 
condition, imply f(s) = f(t)f(r).  
 
LEMMA C.1. Under multiplicative representation, for each  > 0, -unit invariance 
implies 1/-unit invariance. 
 
PROOF. We use Lemma 4.3. We show that f(s/)  f(t/)f(r/) implies f(s)  
f(t)f(r). Assume the former inequality. Say f(s/) < f(t/)f(r/). Assume 0 < t < s < r 
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(the case 0 < r < s < t is similar). By continuity, we can replace t by  t~ > t with s > t~ > t 
such that f(s/) = f( t~/)f(r/). -unit invariance and Lemma 4.3 imply f(s) = 
f( t~)f(r), implying f(s) < f(t)f(r). Similarly, f(s/) > f(t/)f(r/) implies f(s) > 
f(t)f(r) by replacing r by  r~ < r to give equality, and so on. QED  
 
The following result immediately follows from Lemma C.1. 
 
COROLLARY C.2. Under multiplicative representation, -compound invariance for 0 < 
  1 implies it for all  > 0.  
 
Appendix D. Proofs using useful functional equations and 
their relations 
 This appendix presents some functional equations and shows how they can be 
used to prove our results. We present this part of the proof in a separate appendix 
because the functional equations that we give, and their relations and applications, are 
of interest on their own. They are considerably simpler and more accessible than 
many related proofs published before. For an alternative general technique for 
deriving similar functional equations, see Harvey (1990). 
 We show in particular that a number of well-known characterizations of 
functional forms, derived independently in the literature, all amount to the same 
mathematical theorem. They can all immediately be obtained from one another 
through simple substitutions of variables, and all follow from Figure D.1 below. They 
are dicussed in Remark D.2. 
 Figure D.1 depicts the functional equations and their relations. In the figure, each 
of the six cases within dashed rectangles presents a logical equivalence, regarding 
functions f: F   or g: G  , where F and G can be any interval as described, and 
with wiggles or bars added as appropriate. Throughout, we follow the convention that 
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for  = 0,   
exp(t)  1

  =  lim0
exp(t)  1

  =  t. It implies, by substitutions for t, 
t

  1

  =   ln t, and  
(ln t~)  1

  =  ln(lnt)  for  = 0.  
 Regarding quantifiers, the functional equations (the upper implications) should 
hold throughout for all s, t, r, and  such that all arguments used in the f and g 
functions are contained in the domain (F or G), again with wiggles and bars added as 
appropriate. For the forms of the functions f and g (the lower equations in all the 
dashed rectangles), there should exist real , , and  (or  = exp() > 0) and then it 
should hold for all arguments t. 
 The first result (Eq. D.1) gives the well known characterization of CARA (linear-
exponential) utility. To see this point, interpret f as the utility function in expected 
utility. The premise equality in the upper implication entails that receiving s for sure is 
equally preferable as a 50-50 prospect of receiving t or r. The consequent equality 
entails that the indifference is preserved if a constant amount  is added to all 
outcomes. This is constant absolute risk aversion for certainty equivalents of 50-50 
prospects, which is enough to imply that f is exponential (CARA) (Aczél 1966 p. 153 
Theorem 2; Harvey 1990 Theorem 1b; Miyamoto 1983 Lemma 1). All the other 
results in the figure immediately follow from the italicized substitutions described in 
the first lines of the dashed rectangles. The transformation for Eq. D.3 was used by 
Ebert & Prelec (2007, Appendix). The equations and their implications are discussed 
further in Remark D.2. 
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g~( t~) =   exp( 
(ln t~)  1

 )                                                   (D.3´) 
f(t) =  +  
exp(t)  1

                                                               (D.1) 
Function substitution: g = exp  f. No argument substitution.  = exp(). 
Function substitution: f

 = f  ln. Argument substitution (z = t,s,r,): z = exp(z).  
F  ;                      f(s) = 
f(t)+f(r)
2
    f(+s) = 
f(+t)+f(+r)
2
    
 
F

  (0,);                f

(s) = 
f

( t)+f

( r)
2
    f

(

s) = 
f

(

t)+f

(

r)
2
    
f

( t) =  +  
t

  1

                                                                     (D.2) 
F
~
  (0,1);                 f
~
(s~) = 
f
~
( t~)+f
~
( r~)
2
    f
~
(s~

~
) = 
f
~
( t~

~
)+f
~
( r~

~
)
2
  
G  ;                     g(s) = g(t)g(r)    g(+s) = g(+t)g(+r)   
G
~
  (0,1);                g~(s~) = g~( t~)g~(r~)    g~(s~

~
) = g~( t~

~
)g~(r~

~
)   
G

  (0,);               g(s) = g( t)g(r)    g(

s) = g(

t)g(

r)   
f
~
( t~) =  + 
(ln t~)  1

                                                              (D.3) 
 
g( t) =   exp( 
t

  1

)                                                            (D.2´) 
Function substitution: f
~
 = f

  (ln). Argument substitution (z = t,s,r):z~ = exp(z); ~ = . 
Function substitution: g = exp  f. No argument substitution.  = exp(). 
Function substitution: g~ = exp  f~. No argument substitution.  = exp(). 
FIGURE D.1. Functional equations and their interrelations. 
 
 
g(t) =   exp( 
exp(t)  1

)                                                      (D.1´) 
 
 
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REMARK D.1. The following additional results hold for Figure D.1. 
 The functions f, f

, g, and g are strictly increasing if and only if  > 0, and strictly 
decreasing if and only if  < 0. For the functions f
~
 and g~ it is reversed, and they are 
strictly increasing if and only if  < 0 and strictly decreasing if and only if  > 0. 
 For f

 (D.2) and g (D.2´) we can add 0 to the domain if and only if  > 0 
(alternatively,   0 can be allowed if we allow for function values  or  at t = 0). 
Correspondingly, for f
~
 (D.3) and g~ (D.3´) we can add 1 to the domain if and only if  
> 0 (alternatively,   0 can be allowed if we allow for function values  or  at t = 
1). 
 For f
~
 (D.3) we can add 0 to the domain if we allow for function values  ( > 0) 
or  (  0) at t = 0. Correspondingly, for g~ (D.3´) we can add 0 to the domain if  > 0 
(then g~(0) = exp() = 0) or if we allow for the value  (= exp()) at t = 0 (  0).  
 
REMARK D.2. We discuss related literature. Equations D.1-D.3´ refer to Figure D.1, 
and all theorems cited below follow from Figure D.1: 
 Eq. D.1: As explained above, this is related to CARA (constant absolute risk 
averse, or linear-exponential) utility functions. Axiomatizations include Aczél 
(1966 Theorem 3.1.3.2), Harvey (1990 Theorem 1b), Miyamoto (1983 Lemma 1), 
Nagumo (1930 p. 78 and proof), and Pfanzagl (1959 Theorem 3, p. 290). 
 Eq. D.2: CRRA (constant relative risk averse, or log-power) utility functions. Now 
indifferences are preserved under multiplication by a positive factor. 
Axiomatizations include Hardy, Littlewood, & Pòlya (1934, Theorem 84), Aczél 
(1966 Theorem 3.1.3.2) and Miyamoto (1983 Lemma 1). 
 Eq. D.3: Prelec’s (1998) projection invariance, axiomatized in his Proposition 5.16  
 Eq. D.1´: Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker’s (2009) CADI (constant absolute 
decreasing impatience), axiomatized in their Theorem 5.3. 
                                               
16 Note here that his expression 1  ln(p) can be rewritten as ln(p/exp(1-)).  That is, it involves a 
rescaling of the argument p. 
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 Eq. D.2´: Prelec’s (1998) conditional invariance, axiomatized in his Proposition 4, 
and Bleichrodt, Rohde, & Wakker’s (2009) CRDI (unit invariance), axiomatized in 
their Theorem 6.3. 
 Eq. D.3´: Compound invariant probability weighting. Axiomatizations include 
Luce (2001), Al-Nowaihi & Dhami (2006), and Prelec (1998 Proposition 1).   
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.6 (derived from Eq. D.3´). Statement (ii) follows from 
Statement (i) through substitution. We, hence, assume Statement (ii) and derive 
Statement (i) and the uniqueness results. We will use Eq. D.3´ and Remark D.1 for the 
case G
~
 = [0,1]. We assume the multiplicative representation of Observation 3.5, and 
turn to the shape of w(p) = g~( t~). By Lemma B.2, -compound invariance follows for 
all  > 0. By Lemma 3.4, -compound invariance is equivalent to the upper 
implication in Eq. D.3´. This is equivalent to w = g~ being of the form in Eq. D.3´. To 
obtain Eq. 2.5 from Eq. D.3´ we substitute, with p = t~: 
  = exp(


);  = /, 
where further  > 0 so as to include the endpoints of the domain [0,1], and  < 0 so as 
to have the function increasing. The uniqueness results at the end of the theorem 
follow from the uniqueness in Observation 3.5.  
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4 (derived from Eq. D.2´). Statement (ii) follows from 
Statement (i) through substitution. We, hence, assume Statement (ii) and derive 
Statement (i) and the uniqueness results. We will use Eq. D.2´ and Remark D.1 for a 
general T = G

  [0,). We assume the multiplicative representation of Observation 4.2 
and turn to the shape of f(t) = g( t). By Lemma C.2, -unit invariance follows for all  
> 0. By Lemma 4.3, -unit invariance is equivalent to the upper implication in Eq. 
D.2´. This is equivalent to f = g being of the form in Eq. D.2´.  
 To obtain Eqs. 4.4-4.6 from Eq. D.2´ we substitute, besides t = t, and with  < 0 so 
as to have the function decreasing: 
If  > 0 (c > 0): k =   exp( 
1

), r = /, and c = . 
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If  = 0 (c = 0): k = , r = , and c = . 
If  < 0 (c < 0): k =   exp( 
1

), r = /, and c = .  
 The uniqueness results at the end of the theorem follow from the uniqueness in 
Observation 4.2.  
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